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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CHARLIE BROWN CONSTRUCTION CO.,
INC., a Nevada Corporation,
CHARLIE BROWN and CARMA BROWN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Case No.

vs.
LEISURE SPORTS INCORPORATED, a
Nevada Corporation, WEST VILLAGE
UNIT NO. ONE, MT. HOLLY
RECREATION COMMUNITY, CONRAD H.
KONING, and AMY J. KONING,

Category 13

Defendants-Respondents•
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Plaintiffs-Appellants hereby petition this Court, pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-4 (1987) and R. Utah S. Ct. 42, to issue a
writ directing the Court of Appeals to certify the decision and
record in the above-entitled case to this Court for review.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Is the decision of the Court of Appeals in conflict with

prior decisions of this Court where the Court of Appeals held that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiffs1 case, with prejudice, where plaintiffs' delays in prosecution of the case were justified under the circumstances, and
defendants were equally at fault in contributing to the delay?

2.

Did the Court of Appeals err in failing to hold that the

trial court was required to consider whether less drastic sanctions than dismissal would be appropriate?
OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS
The

opinion

of the

Court

of Appeals

in this matter

reported at 740 P.2d 1368 and at 64 Utah Adv. Rep. 25.

is

A copy of

the slip opinion issued by the Court of Appeals is attached hereto
as Appendix A.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The decision of the Court of Appeals was filed on August 17,
1987.

On September 14, 1987, appellants sought and obtained an

extension of time to file the within petition to September 30,
1987.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §

78-2a-4 (1987), and the petition was timely filed pursuant to R.
Utah S. Ct. 45.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an action for specific

performance of the defendants' obligation to pave certain roads in
a subdivision, and for damages, attorney's fees and other relief
as authorized by the contract and by applicable statutes.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Courts.

Plaintiffs' complaint was filed on June 15, 1981.

The trial court

purported to dismiss the case, sua sponte, by minute entry entered
2

on June 18, 1984.

Defendants1 attorney did not prepare any order

of dismissal nor was one signed at that time, but defendants1
attorney filed a Notice of Withdrawal on or about June 25, 1984.
The plaintiffs

filed

February 25, 1985.
1985.

a motion to set aside the dismissal on

The matter was heard by the court on March 18,

The court denied the motion and entered an order on March

27, 1985, formally dismissing the action with prejudice.
Plaintiffs perfected an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.
The case was transferred by the Supreme Court to the Court of
Appeals.

The Court

of Appeals heard

oral arguments1 and an

opinion affirming the dismissal was filed on August 17, 1987.
C.

Statement of Facts.

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on

June 15, 1981, and subsequently filed a non-resident cost bond.
Defendants answered the Complaint on July 6, 1981.
1982, plaintiffs

filed

a Notice

deposition of defendants.
rescheduled for July 9, 1982.

of Deposition

(R. 15.)
(R. 17.)

On May 24,

scheduling

the

The deposition was later
On June 21, 1982, John B.

Maycock entered an appearance as co-counsel for defendants (R.
20), and on July 8 called plaintiffs' attorney and stated that
defendants would not appear for their depositions.

x

(Tr. page 2

John L. Miles, the attorney who represented plaintiffs
before the trial court, prepared the briefs but withdrew as
counsel prior to oral arguments. Plaintiffs were represented at
oral arguments by the attorneys appearing herein.

3

line 19 to page 3 line 7.)

Defendants later, on July 9 and July

16, filed motions for protective orders to prevent the previously
scheduled depositions.

Defendants1 original counsel,

(R. 23-27.)

Scott Thorley, filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel on October
26, 1982.

(R. 28.)

On April
inadvertently

4,

1983, plaintiffs

served

previously withdrawn.

them

only

filed

on

interrogatories,

Scott

Thorley,

who

(R. 34; Tr. page 3 lines 15-24.)

but
had

Plain-

tiffs served the interrogatories on Mr. Maycock on March 22, 1984,
shortly after discovering the error in service.
On

December

5,

1983,

the

court

issued

(R. 39.)
a

routine

order

directing the parties to show cause why the case should not be
dismissed for failure to prosecute, and also scheduled the matter
for a pre-trial hearing, both matters to be heard on March 19,
1984.

(R. 35-36.)

Mr. Miles contacted Mr. Maycock concerning the

pretrial and the outstanding interrogatories, and learned for the
first time that Mr. Maycock had not received them.
line 25 to page 4 line 4.)

(Tr. page 3

The parties stipulated that additional

time was needed to complete discovery, and based on the stipulation the hearing was continued to April 16, 1984 (R. 40-41; Tr.
page 6 lines 1-7), and then continued for an additional 60 days.
(R. 42.)

A formal stipulation, giving defendants an additional

thirty days to answer the prior interrogatories, and also stating
4

the neither party was ready for the case to be scheduled for
trial, was filed on April 19, 1984.

(R. 43-44.)

On April 30, 1984, the court mailed a notice scheduling a
trial in the case for June 18, 1984.

(R. 35.)

Plaintiffs1

attorney contacted the trial court executive and informed her of
the stipulation of the parties concerning the need for additional
discovery (Tr. page 6, lines 10-14.)

The matter was thereafter

scheduled for a pre-trial on June 18, 1984.

(R. 46.)

A few days before the scheduled pre-trial, on either June 14
or June 15, plaintiffs1

attorney discussed

the scheduled pre-

trial with the trial judge and told him that the parties had
stipulated that the case was not yet ready for trial, and also
informed the judge that settlement negotiations where then pending
and it appeared that the case may have been settled.

The trial

court informed plaintiffs' attorney that based on those representations there would be no need for him (plaintiffs1 attorney) to
appear for the pre-trial scheduled for June 18.
16 to page 7, line 4.)

(Tr. page 6, line

Plaintiff accordingly did not appear at

the pre-trial, and the defendant also failed to appear.

On that

date, the court directed the filing of a Minute Entry purporting
to dismiss the action with prejudice.

(R. 48.)

The Minute Entry purporting to dismiss the case was mailed to
counsel,

but

no

order

of

dismissal

5

was

prepared

or

signed.

Defendants' attorney filed a notice of withdrawal as counsel on
June 25, 1984.

(R. 50.)

The Minute Entry purporting to dismiss

the case did not come to the attention of plaintiffs' attorney,
and he took no action on the case for a period of several months
because he understood the case had been settled.
lines

13-20.)

In

January,

1985, plaintiffs

(Tr. page 7,

contacted

attorney to determine what was happening with the case.

their
Plain-

tiffs' attorney then discovered for the first time that the case
had not been settled (Id.), and that the court had purported to
dismiss the case.

(Tr. page 8, lines 14-17.)

Plaintiffs attempted to obtain a stipulation that the Minute
Entry be set aside, and when those efforts failed plaintiffs filed
a motion to set aside the dismissal.
9, line 7; R. 52-56.)
18,

1985, and

(Tr. page 8, line 18 to page

The motion was heard by the court on March

the court

denied

the motion

to

set

dismissal and entered a formal order of dismissal.
thereafter perfected this appeal.

6

aside the
Plaintiffs

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING
THIS CASE WITH PREJUDICE.
Plaintiffs

acknowledge

that the trial

court

is given a

considerable latitude of discretion in determining whether to
dismiss a case for lack of prosecution, and that plaintiffs have
the burden on appeal of showing an abuse of discretion.

Depart-

ment of Social Services v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah
1980).

The discussion below establishes that such an abuse of

discretion clearly occurred.

No prior decision of this Court has

affirmed a dismissal under circumstances equivalent to those in
this case, and several decisions have reversed dismissals under
more egregious circumstances.

The decision

of the Court of

Appeals is a departure from prior decisions of this Court.

This

Court should grant the Petition for Writ of Certiorari to review
that decision.
Dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is a harsh,
extreme,

and permanent

dominium

Management

sanction.

Committee

v.

See

Bonneville

Thompson

Tower Con-

Michie Associates,

Inc. , 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1986); Hildebrand v. Honeywell,
Inc. , 622 F.2d

179

(5th Cir. 1980)

(dismissal

is an extreme

sanction appropriate only where there has been willful contempt
or contumacious conduct).

Although the trial court is granted
7

discretion

in

the

matter,

the

discretion

is

"not

a mental

discretion, to be exercised ex gratia, but a legal discretion, to
be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law, and in a
manner

to

subserve,

substantial justice."

and

not

impede

or defeat,

the

ends of

Levee District No. 4 v. Small, 281 S.W.2d

614 (Mo. App. 1955) (citation omitted) .
While each case must be decided based on the totality of its
own unique facts and circumstances, Department of Social Services
v. Romero.

609 P.2d

1323, 1324

(Utah

1980),

this Court has

enunciated the following basic factors to be considered:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The conduct of both parties.
The opportunity each has had to move the
case forward.
What each of the parties have done to
move the case forward.
What difficulty or prejudice may have
been caused to the other side.
And, most important, whether injustice
may result from the dismissal.

Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1977), citing
Westinahouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor,
Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975).
Consideration of these factors must always be guided by the
principle that "the very reason for the existence of courts is to
afford disputants and opportunity to be heard . . . ."
doubts as to the propriety

of dismissal must

8

Id.

Any

accordingly be

resolved in favor of allowing the matter to proceed to resolution
on the merits.

Id.

Dismissal of the instant case was an abuse of discretion.
First, the defendants contributed substantially to the delay, but
the trial court failed to give any consideration to that factor.
Second, the delays of the pretrial, which appear to have been the
delays which were the motivating factor in the trial court's
decision, were all stipulated to by the parties and excused by
the trial court.

Third, no prior decision of this court approves

a dismissal under equivalent circumstances.

Finally, the delay

in bringing the motion to set aside the minute entry of dismissal
was not justification

for the extreme sanction of dismissal.

These points will be addressed in order.
A.
The Lower Courts Abused Their Discretion in Failing to
Give Proper Weight to the Failure of Defendants to Prosecute the
Case.
Several decisions of this Court establish that each party in
a lawsuit has an obligation to take appropriate steps to move
litigation along.

Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368,

1369 (Utah 1977); Westinghouse Electric Supply v. Paul W. Larsen
Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975); Crystal Lime &
Cement Co. v. Robbins, 8 Utah 2d 389, 393, 335 P.2d 624, 626
(1959) .
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The delays in this case were predominantly of two types:
Delays

resulting

from the

continuances

of the pretrials and

orders to show cause, and delays relating to discovery.

Defen-

dants were equally to blame as were plaintiffs for both types of
delays, if not more so.

It is important that both parties failed

to appear at each of the pretrials, not just the plaintiffs.

The

discovery delays consisted primarily of the plaintiff failing to
seek

sanctions

for

the

defendants'

delay

in

responding

to

interrogatories, and in failing to seek a ruling on defendants1
attempt to avoid submission to depositions.
In each of the decisions cited above, this Court held it was
an abuse of discretion to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute
where the defendants were equally at fault in contributing to the
delay.

The Court of Appeals failed to follow those precedents.

B.
The Delays Relating to the Pretrial Conferences Were
Each Excused by the Trial Court and Stipulated to by the Parties.
A review of the record in this case compels the conclusion
that the court dismissed the case because of its perception that
the parties had ignored an order to attend a pretrial conference.
The undisputed facts established, however, that each such failure
was excused by the trial court.
scheduled.

Three such conferences were

The first, scheduled for March 19, 1984, was con-

tinued to April 16, 1984, based on an oral stipulation of the
parties that discovery was continuing and that the matter was not
10

yet ready for trial.

This stipulation was communicated to the

court by telephone on March 19 and approved by the trial court.
The second pretrial, scheduled for April 16, 1984, was continued
for the same reason as the first.

A written stipulation which

was the basis for the continuance was filed on April 19, 1984.
A third pretrial, scheduled for June 18, 1984, was apparently the precipitating cause of the dismissal.

Neither party

attended that pretrial, presumably because both parties understood that the court had agreed to a continuance of the pretrial.
It was undisputed that Mr. Miles had personally spoken with the
trial court a few days before the hearing and explained the
circumstances of the case, and that the trial court had stated
that it would not be necessary for the parties to attend the
pretrial.
Although it would have been advisable for Mr. Miles to have
confirmed in writing his agreement with the trial court, imposing
the harsh and permanent sanction of a dismissal with prejudice
for that failure is certainly an abuse of discretion.

Clearly,

an attorney has the right to rely upon a trial judge's direction
and representation.

No prior decision of this Court can be read

as authorizing or condoning a dismissal under similar circumstances.

11

C.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals Conflicts with
Prior Decisions of this Court.
The Court of Appeals stated that dismissal of the instant
case

was

justified

by

Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323

this

Court's

holding

in

Maxfield

v.

(Utah 1975), in which this Court by a

three-two decision affirmed a dismissal for failure to prosecute.
The facts of Maxfield are clearly distinguishable on the important

factors

Although

as

outlined

the total time

complaint

by

other

decisions

in Maxfield

from the

to dismissal was only approximately

of

this

filing

Court.
of the

two years, the

entire history of the case was characterized by total failure of
the plaintiff to do anything to move the case forward and by
diligent efforts by defendant to bring the case to trial.

In

addition, the plaintiff had ignored prior orders of the court
without apparent excuse.
There

The instant case is not at all similar.

is no evidence of any attempt

defendants

to

efforts were
Furthermore,

move
those

the

case

of delay

plaintiffs

in the instant case by

forward.
and

timely

Instead,

failure

complied

defendants1

to timely

with

all

respond.

orders

and

directives of the trial court.
Two other cases are illustrative of circumstances in which
this Court has affirmed a dismissal with prejudice.

In Grundmann

v. Williams and Peterson, 685 P.2d 538 (Utah 1984), the opinion
reflects that there was absolutely no activity in the case for a
12

period of over four years.

In Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 29

Utah 2d 259, 508 P.2d 528 (1973), there was a four and a half
year period during which the plaintiff took no action of any
kind.

Neither of these cases is similar to the instant case.
Cases

in which this Court has reversed

a dismissal

for

failure to prosecute equally compel the conclusion that the trial
court and Court of Appeals abused their discretion in this case.
For example, in Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah
1977), the complaint was filed on January 25, 1972, and only
insignificant efforts and no discovery occurred from then until
January 23, 1973.

Thereafter absolutely no action was taken for

a period of nearly four years.

(The total life span of the

instant case was four and a half years, and the longest single
delay was ten and one-half months.)

This Court stated:

As to the lack of prosecution, it seems
that neither party had any active interest in
the matter for nearly four years.
Since either party could have brought the
matter to a conclusion it is difficult to see
why the plaintiff should be denied his claim
to more than $38,000 simply because counsel
for plaintiff did not take a default judgment.
571 P.2d at 1369.

This Court further distinguished and ques-

tioned its former decision in Maxfield, upon which the Court of
Appeals in the instant case relied.

13

571 P.2d at 1370.

Under the

facts in Firebrand, this Court held that it was an abuse of
discretion to dismiss the case with prejudice.2
The facts and circumstances in the instant case are less
egregious than those in Firebrand.

The Court of Appeals, without

explaining its reasoning in any detail, asserted that Firebrand
was distinguishable and instead relied on Maxfield, which this
Court questioned in Firebrand.

The decision of the Court of

Appeals was clearly erroneous and in conflict with prior decisions of this Court, and should be reversed.
D.
Plaintiffs1 Failure to Take Immediate Action to Set
Aside the Minute Entry of Dismissal was Not Grounds for Dismissal
with Prejudice.
The only aspect of this case which might have warranted some
sanction by the trial court was the approximately eight month
time period between the trial court's minute entry purporting to
dismiss the case and plaintiffs' motion to set aside the dismissal.

Even

that

error, however,

was

justified

under the

circumstances, and was due in part to the defendants' failure to
take appropriate action.

2

Other decisions of this Court compel the conclusion that
dismissal of the instant case was an abuse of discretion. Utah
Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977) (dismissal was abuse
of discretion where both parties could have moved the case
forward but failed to do so and delay was due in part to settlement negotiations); Polk v. Ivers, 561 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1977)
(either party could have moved case forward).
14

The unsigned minute entry purporting to dismiss the case was
clearly not a final order, and did not effect a dismissal of the
case.

Wisden v. Salina, 696 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1985); Wilson v.

Manning, 645 P.2d 655 (Utah 1982).

Defendants had an obligation

upon receipt of the minute entry to prepare an appropriate order
and to submit it to plaintiffs for approval prior to submission
to the court.

Rules of Practice in the District Courts and

Circuit Courts of the State of Utah 2.9.

Such a proposed order

would likely have evoked a response from plaintiffs.
Mr. Miles' failure to take action after the entry of the
minute entry,

is not adequate justification

extreme sanction of dismissal on plaintiffs.

for imposing the

Mr. Miles failed to

take action because he thought the case had been settled, and
because

the minute

entry

never

came

to his

attention.

As

established in Point II of this petition, the ultimate sanction
of dismissal with prejudice is not appropriate where other lesser
sanctions will serve the ends of justice.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER
WHETHER LESSER SANCTIONS WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE.
Because the sanction of dismissal with prejudice is such a
harsh penalty, several courts have held that the penalty "should
be used quite sparingly and only when less drastic alternatives
have been explored."

Ramsay v. Bailey, 531 F.2d 706, 707 (5th
15

Cir. 1976) cert, denied, 429 U.S. 1107 (1977) (citations omitted) .

Plaintiffs

raised

this

argument

before

the

Appeals at oral argument, but the court apparently

Court

of

failed to

consider the argument.
Although the rule as expressed by the Fifth Circuit Court
has not been adopted in those terms by this Court, it is in
accordance with

decisions

of this Court

which

indicate that

dismissal with prejudice is a harsh remedy and should not be
invoked

except

where

necessary,

Bonneville

Tower

Condominium

Management Committee v. Thompson Michie Associates, Inc., 728
P.2d

1017, 1020

(Utah 1986), and that a dismissal

reversed if it results in an injustice.

should be

Department of Social

Services v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980).

Plaintiffs

respectfully submit that the trial court in this case should be
required to consider whether lesser sanctions, such as dismissal
without

prejudice

or

imposing monetary

sanctions

against

the

parties or their attorneys or both, should be imposed prior to
imposing the ultimate sanction of dismissal.
In the instant case, a dismissal without prejudice would
have

accomplished

the trial

court's purpose

in clearing

its

calendar and clearly communicating to the parties its displeasure
with

the

delays

in the proceedings.

This would

have been

especially appropriate because most of the delays were equally
16

the

fault

of defendants.

Imposing

the whole

brunt

of the

sanction against plaintiffs with a dismissal with prejudice was
an abuse of discretion, and the decision of the trial court and
Court of Appeals should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The delays in this case, while not to be condoned, do not
warrant

the

extreme

sanction

of

dismissal

with

prejudice.

Defendants were equally at fault in contributing to or allowing
the delays.

The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that

dismissal is at variance with prior decisions of this Court,
especially Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1977).
In addition, the trial court and Court of Appeals

failed to

consider whether lesser sanctions would have been appropriate,
and this Court should impose such a requirement.
This Court should grant the Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The decisions of

the Court of Appeals and the trial court should each be reversed,
and this case remanded for resolution on the merits.

In the

alternative, this case should be remanded with instructions to
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enter a dismissal without prejudice.
DATED this 30th day of September, 1987.

JACKSON HOWARD and
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this
30th day of September, 1987.
Russell J. Gallian
Gallian, Drake & Westfall
One South Main Street
St. George, UT 84770
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Charlie Brown Construction
Co., Inc., a Nevada Corporation,
Charlie Brown and Carma Brown,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
Leisure Sports Incorporated,
a Nevada,Corporation,
West Village Unit No. One,
Mt. Holly Recreation Community,
Conrad H. Koning, and Amy J. Koning,
Defendants and Respondents.
Before Judges Jackson, Bench and Orme

BENCH, J u d g e :

Case No. 860119-CA

FILED
AUG 171987
T'mothyM Shea
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals

Plaintiffs appeal an order of the district court denying
their motion to set aside the dismissal of their complaint. We
affirm.
Plaintiffs are the purchasers and owners of certain lots
at Mount Holly Ski Resort. Defendants are the developers of
the area. On June 15, 1981, plaintiffs filed a complaint
against defendants to compel completion of certain road
improvements. At defendants* request, plaintiffs posted a
non-resident cost bond pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(j).
Defendants then filed their answer on July 6, 1981.
Ten and one-half months later, on May
plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint and a notice
to take defendants Conrad and Amy Koning's depositions. At
defendants* request, the depositions were postponed to July 9,
1982. On June 14, a hearing was held on plaintiffs1 motion to
amend their complaint. Plaintiffs failed to appear and the
motion was denied subject to renewal at a later date. On June
21, 1982, John B. Maycock filed an appearance as defendants*
co-counsel. Subsequently, defendants* original counsel, Scott
J. Thorley, withdrew.

On July 9 and 16, 1982, defendants filed motions for
protective orders requesting their depositions not be taken.
Defendants based their motions on protective orders issued in
concurrent federal litigation. The court never ruled on the
motions, nor did plaintiffs pursue their requested
depositions. Plaintiffs filed interrogatories with the court
on April 4, 1983, nine months after defendants' motions for
protective orders. Plaintiffs' counsel mistakenly mailed a set
of the interrogatories to Thorley, defendants' former counsel,
who never forwarded the interrogatories to Maycock.
On December 5, 1983, after eight more months of
inactivity, the court sua sponte filed an order to show cause
why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
The court ordered both parties to appear on March 19, 1984.
Failure to appear "[would] be considered as acquiescence to
entry of an order of dismissal and the judgment [would] be
entered by the Court without further notice to the parties."
The court also filed a notice for a pre-trial hearing, also set
for March 19, 1984. Plaintiffs realized the error with the
interrogatories and entered into a stipulation with defendants
allowing defendants thirty more days to respond. The
stipulation also gratuitously stated, "this matter should be
stricken from the Court's Pre-Trial Calendar until the parties
have completed their discovery or until either party requests a
Pre-Trial Conference."
The morning of March 19, plaintiffs' counsel telephoned
the trial court judge and informed him of the stipulation. The
trial court excused the parties' absence and in a second order
to show cause continued the pre-trial to April 16, 1984. A
transmittal letter, which referred to the telephone
conversation and the stipulation, was filed on March 22. On
April 16, 1984, the court again continued the matter for sixty
days. A signed stipulation was filed on April 19, 1984. On
April 30, 1984, the trial court sua sponte mailed notices to
the parties setting trial for June 18, 1984. Plaintiffs
contacted the trial court executive and explained the
stipulation. The trial court executive, rather than vacating
the date, sent revised notices changing the trial setting to a
pre-trial hearing.
On June 15, 1984, plaintiffs' counsel personally spoke to
the trial court judge in St. George. Counsel explained the
stipulation and informed the judge a settlement was likely.
The court allegedly excused the parties from appearing at the
June 18 hearing. However, when the matter was called on June
18 and neither party was present, the judge ordered the case
dismissed. In a minute entry, the court stated:
This matter was called on hearing for a
Pre-Trial Conference. No one appeared on
behalf of either party. This matter had
been set several times for pre-trial and
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no one had ever appeared. The Court
ordered the matter dismissed with
prejudice and on the merits. The minute
entry will serve as the Order of
Dismissal. A copy is to be mailed to the
respective parties.
The court clerk mailed copies of the unsigned minute entry to
both parties on June 28.
Due to error, allegedly on the part of plaintiffs'
counsel's secretary, the minute entry did not come to
plaintiffs' counsel's attention until seven months later in
January, 1985.1 When plaintiffs' counsel became aware of the
minute entry, he attempted to consult with the trial court and
defendants. Unable to do so, he filed a motion on February 25
to set aside the dismissal. At a hearing on March 18, 1985,
the court reviewed the entire file and considered arguments of
counsel.2 The court, noting plaintiffs' failure diligently
to prosecute their lawsuit, affirmed the dismissal and entered
orders accordingly.
On appeal, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in
denying plaintiffs' motion to set aside the dismissal.
Plaintiffs argue under Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b) the court has no
authority to dismiss for failure to prosecute absent a motion
by defendants. The rule states, "For failure of the plaintiff
to prosecute or comply with these rules or any order of court,
a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim
against him." The language in Rule 41(b) merely permits, not
requires, a motion by defendant. The Utah Supreme Court, in
Brasher Motor and Finance Co. v. Brown, 23 Utah 2d 247, 461
P.2d 464, 464-65 (1969), states, "In dismissing an action for
want of prosecution, the court may proceed under [Rule 41(b)],
or it may, of its own motion, take action to that end." See
also Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980). Under
the comparable federal rule, the United States Supreme Court
similarly held:
1. During this seven month period, Maycock filed a notice of
withdrawal and defendants Konings, in reliance on the minute
entry, sold their shares in co-defendant Leisure Sports, Inc.
2. Defendants opposed plaintiffs' motion, arguing their counsel
never had been authorized to enter into any stipulation to delay
the action. The claim is of questionable relevance and is not a
factor in our decision.
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Neither the permissive language of the
Rule—which merely authorizes a motion by
the defendant—nor its policy requires us
to conclude that it was the purpose of the
Rule to abrogate the power of courts,
acting on their own initiative, to clear
their calendars of cases that have
remained dormant because of the inaction
or dilatoriness of the parties seeking
relief. The authority of a court to
dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution
has generally been considered an "inherent
power/ governed not by rule or statute
but by the control necessarily vested in
courts to manage their own affairs so as
to achieve the orderly and expeditious
disposition of cases.
Link v. Wabash R. Co.. 370 U. S. 626, 630-31 (1962).
As stated in Lake Meredith Reservoir Co. v. Amitv Mutual
Irrigation Co., 698 P.2d 1340, 1344 (Colo. 1985), "The burden
is upon the plaintiff to prosecute a case in due course without
unusual or unreasonable delay." Plaintiffs are required "to
prosecute their claims with due diligence, or accept the
penalty of dismissal." Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323,
1325 (Utah 1975). Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a
decision within the broad discretion of the trial court. This
Court will not interfere with that decision unless it clearly
appears that the court has abused its discretion and that there
is a likelihood an injustice has been wrought. Department of
Soc. Serv. v. Romero. 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980).
At the March 18 hearing on plaintiffs' motion to set aside
the dismissal, the court reviewed the entire file. The court
reviewed plaintiffs' ten and one-half months delay after
defendants filed their answer and plaintiffs' failure to attend
the hearing on their motion to amend their complaint. The
court reviewed plaintiffs* failure to pursue a ruling on
defendants' motion for protective orders against the requested
depositions. The court reviewed another ten month delay before
plaintiffs pursued another discovery device, namely the
interrogatories. The court also reviewed eight months more of
delay before plaintiffs discovered defendants did not have the
interrogatories. Finally, and as noted by the court in its
order denying plaintiffs' motion to set aside the dismissal,
the court reviewed yet another eight months delay by plaintiffs
from the time notification of the minute entry was received
until they filed a motion to set aside the dismissal.
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Plaintiffs argue the court erred in dismissing their action
in light of the court's alleged excusal of both parties'
appearance at the June 18 hearing. Plaintiffs contend the
trial court was bound by the parties* prior stipulation to
postpone any pre-trial conference which was communicated to and
filed with the court. However, a trial court is not
necessarily bound by a mere stipulation between parties which
has not been incorporated in an order where the stipulation
attempts to wrest from the court control of its own calendar.
See Lake Meredith, 698 P.2d at 1346.
Regardless of whether the trial court never knew of,
ignored, or simply forgot about the stipulation, plaintiffs
themselves failed to comply with the intent of the
stipulation. The primary purpose of the stipulation was to
provide defendants an additional thirty days to respond to the
interrogatories. When the thirty day period expired and no
response had been received, plaintiffs did not move under Utah
R. Civ. P. 37 for an order compelling discovery nor attempt in
any way to move the case forward.
Plaintiffs do not claim the stipulation as an excuse for
any of their numerous delays. Rather, plaintiffs* counsel
asserts secretarial error as an excuse for the delay after
receipt of the minute entry. Generally, law office delays or
failures are unacceptable excuses for failure to prosecute.
Valente v. First Western Savings and Loan Ass'n, 528 P.2d 699,
700 (Nev. 1974).
Plaintiffs last argue the trial court erred in dismissing
their action with prejudice and on the merits. Rule 41(b)
states, "Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal
not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack
of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an
indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the
merits.** Plaintiffs cite three Utah Supreme Court cases which
reversed a trial court's dismissal with prejudice as an abuse
of discretion. Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah
1977) (motion to dismiss filed at the same time as defendant's
answer); Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977)
(delay due to settlement negotiations); Crystal Lime & Cement
Co. v. Robbins, 8 Utah 2d 389, 335 P.2d 624 (1959) (failure to
consider counterclaims). These three cases are readily
distinguishable. The facts of this case are much closer to
those of Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975). In
Maxfield, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's
dismissal with prejudice against the plaintiff for "inexcusable
neglect in failing to prepare and prosecute her claim with
reasonable diligence.- id. at 1324-25. In the instant case,
the trial court provided plaintiffs "an opportunity to be heard
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and to do justice*- Westinahouse Elec. S U P P I V Co, v. Paul W.
Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975).
Plaintiffs nevertheless abused their opportunity through
dilatory conduct.
We therefore find no abuse of discretion and affirm the
trial court's order denying plaintiffs' motion to set aside the
dismissal. Costs to defendants.

Russell W. Bench, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

Norman H. Jackson, Judge
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